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ERISA QUALIFIED PENSION PLAN 
BENEFITS AS PROPERTY OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE: THE 
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
AFTER PATTERSON v. SHUMATE 
JACK E. KARNS* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the 1992 Supreme Court decision in Patterson v. Shu-
mate, l a vexing issue in bankruptcy-law was whether ERISA qual-
ified pension plan benefits should be considered an asset of the 
debtor that should be included in the bankruptcy estate, and 
thereby be made available to the trustee to satisfy creditor claims. 
This problem emanated from interpretations of two important 
subsections of the Bankruptcy Code. First, section 541(a)(1) pro-
vides that the bankruptcy estate shall consist of "all legal or equi-
table interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement 
of the case."2 There can be no question that this broad language 
was meant to include pension plan benefits as property of the 
* Professor of Business Law, East Carolina University. LL.M. (Taxation), 
1992, Georgetown University; J .D., 1981, Tulane University; M.P.A., M.S., 1974, 
B.A., 1973, Syracuse University. 
1. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992). 
2. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323; S. REP. No. 989, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868. 
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bankruptcy estate absent some other disqualifying provision 
within the Code. The second part of this pre-Patterson analysis 
required a review of section 541(c)(2) which states that a trust will 
be excluded from the estate if there is an anti-alienation clause 
restricting the participant's ability to freely transfer an interest.3 
In addition, this "anti-alienation" provision is required by the 
Bankruptcy Code to be enforceable under "applicable nonban-
kruptcy law."4 
For nearly a decade a veritable judicial free-for-all developed 
among the various federal appellate courts as to the correct inter-
pretation of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law."5 Bank-
ruptcy debtors had much at stake in this dispute since all ERISA 
qualified pension plans by definition include an anti-alienation 
clause, thereby raising the prospect that plan benefits should be 
excluded from the estate.6 Interestingly, there is a similar anti-
alienation provision in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC),7 which 
raised even more questions concerning Congressional intent as to 
whether pension plan benefits were property of the bankruptcy 
estate. 
Three case lines eventually developed delineating different 
approaches to this definitional problem. Prior to 1991, the major-
ity view held that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" should be 
defined narrowly to mean only state spendthrift trust law.8 
Although this approach seemed at odds with the actual language 
of the Bankruptcy Code, pFeponents were able to find support in 
the legislative history. 
A second approach achieved parity with the majority view in 
1991. Decisions by the Third,9 Sixth,lO and Tenthll Circuits pos-
ited that the majority view prior to 1991 was derived from an 
improper reliance on legislative history.12 Proponents of this 
3. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988). The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 401(a)(13) (1988), and ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988), contain similar 
anti-alienation clauses. 
4. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). 
5. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text. 
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988). 
7. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) (1988). 
8. See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. 
9. Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991). 
10. In re Lucas, 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991). 
11. In re Harline, 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2991 
(1992). 
12. In re Lucas, at 603. 
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approach held that had Congress intended to limit the meaning of 
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" to state spendthrift trust laws it 
would have provided explicit language in section 541(c)(2) restrict-
ing the reach of the Code. I3 Proponents of the second view con-
cluded "applicable nonbankruptcy law" certainly contemplated 
both state and federal law and that this provision should be 
accorded its "plain meaning."14 The obvious conclusion from this 
analysis was that the federal ERISA statute must be viewed as 
"applicable nonbankruptcy law," and therefore, an anti-alienation 
provision in any plan meant that plan benefits had to be excluded 
from the bankruptcy estate. I5 
Another line of cases achieved the same result as the second 
approach, but did so by relying ·on the preemption clause con-
tained in section 541(a) of ERISAI6 This section provides that 
ERISA shall "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."17 Such 
preemption provisions are contained in other federal statutes,I8 
and according to proponents of this approach rendered any discus-
sion about the inclusion of pension plan benefits in the bankruptcy 
estate moot. I9 Under this approach state spendthrift trust law 
was nullified by the preemption provision. 
Finally, a third approach arose from decisions exclusively 
within the Eighth Circuit. These decisions held that ERISA quali-
fied pension plan benefits must be included in the bankruptcy 
estate, and that the proper question was whether the benefits 
could then be claimed by the debtor as exempt property under 
either state or federallaw.20 
13. Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 364-65 (4th Cir. 1991), affd, 112 S. 
Ct. 932 (1992). 
14. Id. at 364-65. 
15. Id. at 365. 
16; 29 U.S.C. § 514(a) (1988). 
17.Id. 
18. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 provides in § 1305(a)(1) that the 
states are preempted from enforcing any law "relating to rates, routes, or 
services of any air carrier." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988). By comparison, 
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TPCA) contains a provision 
which expressly provides that state law which imposes intrastate requirements 
more restrictive than federal law will not be preempted by the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 227(e) (Supp. III 1991). 
19. See, e.g., In re Sellers, 107 B.R. 152 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989); In re 
Bryant, 106 B.R. 727 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989). 
20. In re Graham, 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984). See also In re Ridenour, 45 
B.R. 72,77 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984), overruled by In re Leamon, 121 B.R. 974 
3
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The decision ,in Patterson put to rest the ambiguity regarding 
the treatment of qualified pension plan benefits in bankruptcy 
proceedings. The Court relied heavily on the fact that the Bank~ 
ruptcy Code is fraught with specific references to "state law," and 
posited that it is, therefore, inconceivable that the phrase "appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law" should be construed to refer only to 
state spendthrift trust law)!1 In the Court's view, a narrower conL' 
struction of this language could only be supported by an express 
reference to state law.22 
The result reached in Patterson is not as important as the 
manner in which the Court dealt with the competing views. Given 
that the opinion appeared to deal summarily with the opposing 
views, why did it take the Supreme Court so long to take on this 
issue? Also, how could the federal appellate courts have reached 
so many different opinions regarding the meaning of the phrase 
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" as used in the Bankruptcy Code? 
In the past, the Supreme Court has been less than forthright in 
consistently following a "plain meaning" analysis of the Bank-
ruptcy Code's language. In his concurring opinion in Patterson, 
Justice Scalia pointed out ,that in Dewsnup u. Timm 23 the Court 
had refused to follow a consistent methodology in defining statu-
tory language such as that being debated in Patterson .24 In Dew-
snup, the Court refused to consider how a phrase was used in 
another section of the Code in favor of focusing on its meaning in 
one isolated subsection.25 
The Patterson decision left many questions unanswered. 
Since Patterson dealt with ERISA qualified pension plans, serious 
questions still exist as to the proper treatment in bankruptcy of 
nonqualified plans, such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA) 
and Keogh accounts. Participants in these plans clearly are, not 
afforded the broad protection of Patterson, and they are left to 
seek remedies in other sections of the Bankruptcy Code. Addition-
ally, there remain serious questions about how the Patterson case 
will square with potential issues raised under the fraudulent 
transfer and voidable preference povisions of the Code. , Finally, 
(E.D. Tenn. 1990) (quoting H.R. REP No. 595, 95th Cong. , 1st Sess. 176 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6136). 
21. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246-47 (1992). 
22. Id. at 2246. 
23. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992). 
24. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250-51. 
25. Dewsnup , 112 S. Ct. at 776-78. 
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there is the issue of nondischargeability of debts. Should ERISA 
qualified plan benefits survive bankruptcy, will nondischarged 
creditors be able to access the assets of a qualified plan following 
the termination of the bankruptcy proceeding? These open ques-
tions raise significant issues of equity for participants in nonquali-
fied versus qualified pension plans which would appear not to be 
in keeping with the underlying policy rationale of Patterson . 
To better understand the impact of Patterson, as well as 
future debates regarding conflict between state and federal law in 
the Bankruptcy Code, this article will review the underlying case 
law that set the stage for this judicial showdown. Part II specifi-
cally analyzes the competing case lines which excluded pension 
plan benefits from the bankruptcy estate. Part III briefly summa-
rizes those cases which concluded that plan benefits must be 
included in the estate but may be subject to exemption under state 
or federal law. Part IV reviews the Patterson opinion in detail, as 
well as the issues and analysis presented by the Court, and Part V 
addresses the open questions that remain after Patterson . 
Finally, some concluding remarks are. offered to summarize the 
importance of Patterson in terms of its impact on uniform treat-
ment of debtors regardless of jurisdiction, as well as the possibility 
of future conflicts over Bankruptcy Code language given the 
Supreme Court's reliance . on the so-called "plain meaning" 
approach. 
II. INCLUDING ERISA PLAN BENEFITS IN THE BANKRUPTCY 
ESTATE PRE-PATTERSON 
Section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a 
debtor's interest in a pension plan will not become the property of 
the bankruptcy estate if two conditions are met.26 First, the plan 
must include an anti-alienation clause prohibiting transfer of plan 
assets.27 This is a mere formality when qualified plans under 
ERISA are being considered since ERISA requires that an anti-
alienation clause be included in any qualified pension plan. Sec-
ond, the transfer restriction must be enforceable under "applicable 
nonbankruptcy law."28 This presents the more difficult question 
regarding the treatment of pension plan benefits. The construc-
tion of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" is determina-
26. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988). 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
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tive of whether plan benefits are included in the bankruptcy 
estate. 
The majority view prior to 1991 held that the phrase referred 
strictly to state spendthrift trust law, not to any other federal or 
state law. Presumably, this meant that there could be no collat-
eral references to ERISA or the Internal Revenue Code. This view 
was followed by the Second,29 Fifth,30 Ninth,31 and Eleventh32 
Circuit Courts of Appeals and presented a curiously limited inter-
pretation of the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcylaw." No sucll 
limitation was specifically mentioned in the Bankruptcy Code, yet 
federal appellate courts seemed. convinced that such a restrictive 
view was necessary. By following state spendthrift trust law 
. , 
these courts believed that the pension plan should place serious 
restrictions on the participants' ability to control the fund assets. 
These "employer settled" plans were distinguished from "self set-
tled" plans which were ruled not to qualify as state spendthrift 
trusts since the debtor typically had too much control over the 
trust fund. 
The decision by the Fifth Circuit in In re GofF3 highlighted 
the primary points of the ma,jority view. In Goff, the Court 
reviewed the legislative HIstory of section 541(c)(2) and examined 
the language which referred to spendthrift trusts.34 This lan-
guage provided that a "debtor's interest in a spend.thrift trust to 
the extent the trust is protected from creditors under applicable 
state law" would be · excluded from the bankruptcy estate.35 
According to the Fifth Circuit, the only logical interpretation was 
29. See, e.g., Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1982). 
30. See, e.g., In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). 
31. See, e.g., In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 
1016 (1986). 
32. See, e.g., In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985), superseded by 
statute as stated in In re Gherman, 101 B.R. 369 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989). 
33. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). 
34. Id. at 578. The court defined a spendthrift trust: 
In general terms, a spendthrift trust is a trust created for the 
maintenance of a beneficiary, with only a certain portion of the total, 
amount to be distributed at anyone time. The settlor places 
"spendthrift" restrictions on the trust, which operate in most states' to 
place the fund beyond the reach of the beneficiary's creditors, as well as 
to secure the fund against the beneficiary's own improvidence. 
Id. at 580. 
35. Id. at 581 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 369 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 V.S.C .C.A.N. 5963, 6325). 
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that this passage referred only to state spendthrift law and to no 
other nonbankruptcy law.36 
In Goff, the court also analyzed whether Congress intended 
pension plan benefits to be included as property of the bankruptcy 
estate under section 541(a) or to be considered exempt property 
pursuant to section 522.37 This approach was justified since sec-
tion 522, the federal exemption provision, made specific reference 
to pension plans, whereas section 541(c)(2) made no mention of 
such plans.38 According to the Fifth Circuit, this narrowly defined 
the term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include only appropri-
ate state spendthrift trust law.39 Finally, the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered the question of federal preemption under ERISA. The Fifth 
Circuit concluded that ERISA's broad preemption provision did 
not extend to the Bankruptcy Code, or to any other federal statute 
for that matter.40 For all practical purposes, the Goff decision was 
limited in that it did not extend to all pension plans, but rather 
only to those that were controlled by appropriate state spendthrift 
trust law. 
Before 1991 only the Fourth Circuit followed the approach 
that would ultimately be adopted by th~ Supreme Court in Patter-
son. The so-called "plain meaning" view supported an interpreta-
tion of section 541(c)(2) that was not as constraining as that 
followed by the then majority of appellate courts.41 In re Moore 
held that the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" should be 
construed broadly so as to include both state · and federal law.42 
Any restriction liniiting an analysis to only state spendthrift trust 
law was overly narrow, and all that mattered was that the court 
consider whether the plan benefits were subject to any claims by 
creditors arising from any nonbankruptcy law.43 The Moore 
36. Id. at 582. See also In re Brooks, 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988). 
37. Goff, 706 F.2d at 581. 
38. Id. at 585-86. 
39. Id. at 586. 
40. Id. at 587-89. 
41. In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990). 
42. Id. at 1477. See also In re Threewit, 24 B.R. 927 (Bankr. D. Karl. 1982); In 
re Holt, 32 B.R. 767 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984); In re Phillips, 34 B.R. 543 (Bankr. D.S . 
Ohio 1983); In re Rodgers, 24 B.R. 181 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982); In re Pruitt, 30 
B.R. 330 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Ralston, 62 B.R. 502 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1986). 
The Ralston court noted that "the term 'spendthrift trust' does not appear in any 
relevant section of the Bankruptcy Code, in fact, it is not mentioned except in 
reports of the House and Senate." Id. at 503. 
43. In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990). 
. , 
/ 
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court's analysis did not consider the legislative history even 
though the Goff court had relied on it heavily.44 More impor_ 
tantly, according to the Fourth Circuit, section 541(c)(2) was not 
vague or ambiguous in terms of references to state law.45 Con-
gress had been very specific in the Bankruptcy Code when it 
intende~ to refer only to state law.46 Such references were clear 
and incontrovertible. Since section 541(c)(2) did not contain any 
such reference, an interpretation limiting the scope of the provi ... 
sion to state law was inconsistent with a complete reading of the 
Code.47 The "plain meaning" view increased in popularity in 199i1.. 
Beginning in January, four cases were decided by the Third,48 
Sixth,49 and Tenth50 Circuit Courts of Appeals that evened the 
split between the appellate courts and set the stage for a review 
by the Supreme Court. The first case to follow the Moore opinion 
was In re Lucas ,51 which was decided by the Sixth Circuit on Jan-
uary 14, 1991. Again, the facts were not materially different from 
all other caseS presenting the same issue at the federal appellate 
level. The Sixth Circuit, however, was somewhat more insightful 
by making two very important observations. First, if the anti-
transfer clause of a qualified ERISA pension plan can be enforced 
against a creditor, then such clause could similarly be enforced 
against a bankruptcy trustee. 52 From this point, it was logical to 
conclude that the ERISA required anti-alienation clause had to be 
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" as that term was used in the 
appropriate Code secti"On.53 Considering the inter-relationship of 
three significant federal statutes, the Bankruptcy code, ERISA 
and the Internal Revenue Code, the then majority approach could 
not possibly reflect the intent of the statutory language. 54 
The Sixth Circuit also addressed an issue not considered pre ... 
viously by other courts. Specifically, whether the Internal Reve-
nue Service could and would disqualify any pension plan where 
44. Id. at 1478-79. 
45. Id. 
46. In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476, 1478 (4th Cir. 1990). 
47. Id. 
48. See Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991). 
49. See In re Lucas, 950 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 
(1991). 
50. See In re Harline, 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1992). 
51. 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 (1991). 
52. Id. at 603. 
53. Id. at 601. 
54. Id. at 603. 
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the trustee transferred fund assets pursuant to a court decision 
interpreting section 541(c)(2).55 During the 1980's, the IRS issued 
a series of private letter rulings in which it consistently took the 
position that a court ordered transfer of assets to the bankruptcy 
trustee by a trustee of a qualified pension plan, would trigger the 
disqualification of the plan. 56 Although some observers doubted 
that the IRS would take such serious action, there was no ques-
tion that the consequences would be catastrophic for plan partici-
pants. Any plan assets distributed to a bankruptcy trustee would 
have been taxable to the individual participants as ordinary 
income. Further, the employer would lose a deduction for plan 
contributions. Most of the primary tax incentives that led to the 
creation of the plan would be lost. Regardless of whether the IRS 
was simply declaring its statutory prerogative or setting the stage 
for either judicial or legislative action on this matter, the Sixth 
Circuit reasoned that the "plain meaning" approach was a more 
consistent approach to solving this problem. 57 
Following the lead of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, in late 
1991, the ·Third58 and Tenth59 Circuits rendered decisions adopt-
ing the "plain meaning" approach. LittJe noticed at this time was 
the fact that the Fourth Circuit had affj,rmed its decision in Moore 
by applying the precedent in Shumat~ u. Patterson.60 Although 
there is no way to be certain, it seems :reasonable to speculate that 
this issue was getting considerable attention and the even split of 
eight circuits, following the state spendthrift trust and plain 
meaning views, mandated a resolution. 
It also should be noted that the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals had weighed in with yet a third view regarding the inclu-
sion of pension plans in the bankruptcy estate. In the case of In 
re Graham,61 the Eighth Circuit held that plan benefits were 
includable in the estate, but became subject to potential exemp-
55.Id. 
56. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-051 (Dec. 5, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-11-037 (Dec. 20, 
1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-51-067 (Sept. 28, 1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-10-035 (Dec. 9, 
1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-29-125 (Mar. 30, 1984); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-31-020 (May 5, 
1981). 
57. In re Lucas 924 F.2d 597, 603 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2275 
(1991). 
58. Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1991). 
59. In re Harline, 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991). 
60. 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992). 
61. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984). 
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tion under section 522.62 This decision was premised on the 
rationale that the language of the exemption provision was spe-
cific in delineating special treatment for pension plan benefits.63 
This exemption approach had received consideration in a number 
of bankruptcy cases64 and those opinions revealed yet another 
interesting twist in resolving the question as to how qualified plan 
benefits should be handled ultimately. 
III. ERISA PLANS AS EXEMPT PROPERTY PRE-PATTERSON 
Under pre-Patterson law, a debtor whose pension plan bene-
fits were included in the bankruptcy estate could still argue that 
these assets were exempt property under Bankruptcy Code sec-
tion 522.65 This section provides a list of property that is consid-
ered exempt under federal bankruptcy law and must be returned 
to the debtor. A debtor is permitted to choose between this list of 
exempt property and an exemption list provided by state law and 
"other federal nonbankruptcy law," the only restriction being that 
the state in which the petition is filed must have chosen not to "opt 
out" of the federal exemption list. Section 522(b)(2)(A) provides 
that debtors in these so-called "opt out" states may rely on state 
exemption law, as well as any exemptions provided by "other fed-
eral nonbankruptcy law."66 In states that had not opted out of the 
federal scheme, pre-Patterson debtors could claim a partial 
exemption for pension benefits under section 522(d)(10)(E). This 
particular provision limited the exemption, however, to that 
amount "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and 
any dependent of the debtor."67 Under the decisions interpreting 
this provision, debtors were not very successful in protecting the 
full value of the plan.68 Consequently, debtors in non-opt-out 
states often sought to protect their full plan benefits pursuant to 
62. Id. at 1273. 
63. Id. at 1272. 
64. In re Hinshaw, 23 B.R. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). 
65. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988). 
66. Thirty-five states have enacted statutes opting out of the federal 
exemption list including: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West 
Virginia and Wyoming. 
67. 11 U.S.C. § 522,(d)(1O)(E) (1988). 
68. In re Clark, 711 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1983); In re Taff, 10 B.R. 101, 107 (Bankr. 
D. Conn. 1981). 
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section 522(b)(2)(A).69 They were, in essence, similarly situated 
with those debtors in opt-out states who were precluded from rely-
ing upon the federal exemption list. 
This situation led to yet another controversy relative to the 
interpretation of Code language. Since section 522(b)(2)(A) 
allowed debtors to protect plan benefits by looking either to a state 
exemption list or exemptions provided under "other federal 
nonbankruptcy law," they sought refuge in the ERISA statute in 
order to protect maximum plan benefits. The argument was made 
that ERISA constituted "other federal nonbankruptcy law" as con-
templated in section 522, and therefore, the entire plan should be 
exempt. Not surprisingly, most of the federal circuits following 
the state spendthrift rule took the position that ERISA was the 
type of federal law that could be applied by these debtors.70 These 
circuits held that the legislative history's non-exclusive list of ben-
efits and payments that could be exempted under other federal 
nonbankruptcy law did not specifically mention ERISA, and as a 
result, did not contemplate ERISA as falling within the purview of 
section 522.71 This majority view was adopted despite a limited 
number of bankruptcy court rulings to the contrary. 72 
IV. MANDATED EXCLUSION: PATTERSON v. SHUMATE 
On June 15, 1992, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in 
Patterson v. Shumate,73 and in doing so ended the debate as to 
whether ERISA qualified pension plan benefits should be included 
in the bankruptcy estate. For all the conflicting precedents in the 
lower courts, the Patterson decision was strikingly straight for-
ward. The Court did not engage in-a lengthy review of the dispa-
rate viewpoints followed by the various courts of appeals, but 
rather, chose to deal with these issues briefly in concluding that 
the uniformity of treatment of pension plans was a key objective.74 
69. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). 
70. In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 583-86 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Graham, 726 F.2d 
1268, 1274 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); In re Lichstrahl, 750 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th 
Cir. 1985). 
71. In re Goff, 706 F.2d at 586. 
72. In l'e Hinshaw, 23 B.R. 233 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982). 
73. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992). 
74. Id. at 2250. The Court stated: 
Finally, our holding furthers another important policy underlying 
ERISA: uniform national treatment of pension benefits ... Constnling 
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include federal law insures that the 
11
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Patterson involved a pension plan operated by the Coleman 
Furniture Company. Coleman's plan had approximately four 
hundred participants and was qualified under ERISA. One of the 
participants, and the respondent in Patterson, was John B. Shu-
mate, a thirty year employee of the firm who eventually rose to the, 
position of president and chairman of the corporate board.75 
By the early 1980's, Coleman was experiencing serious finan-
cial difficulties which led to the filing of a Chapter Eleven reorgan-' 
ization petition.76 The firm was unable to satisfactorily meet the 
requirements of reorganization, and ultimately its case was con-
verted to a Chapter Seven liquidation with Roy V. Creasy serving 
as trustee.77 During this same time period, Shumate's personal 
financial condition worsened, and he was forced to file for protec-
tion under the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 
His case also was converted to a Chapter Seven liquidation with 
John R. Patterson being appointed as trustee.78 Creasy was the 
first to take action regarding Coleman's pension plan. Creasy ter-
minated the plan according to court order, provided for liquidation , 
of assets, and made complete distributions to all plan participants 
with the exception of Shumate.79 At that point Patterson took an 
Id. 
security of a debtor's pension benefits will be governed by ERISA, not 
left to the vagaries of state spendthrift law. 
75. Id. at 2245. Shumate controlled 96% of all issued and outstanding stock 
at Coleman Furniture Company. He owned 54% outright and controlled another 
42% through a revocable trust, which he had set up as settlor and was also acting 
as trustee. Eventually, he revoked the trust in order to own 96% of Coleman's 
stock outright. Brief for the Petitioner at 5 (hereinafter referred to as 
"Petitioner's Brief'). Patterson, acting as Shumate's bankruptcy trustee, also 
emphasized that as Coleman's majority stockholder, Shumate was in a position 
to replace the entire Board of Directors and that the Board could terminate the 
company's Plan at will and without cause. Id. at 5-6. This argument was relied 
upon at the district court level, which held that "Shumate could have terminated 
the plan at any time before the bankruptcy and received not only his pension 
interest, but any excess funds not needed to satisfy the rights of other 
participants." Id. at 6. 
76. Id. The Chapter Eleven petition was filed on November 3, 1982. Brief of 
Respondent at 2 (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent's Brief'). 
77. Id. There is some disagreement as to whether the Chapter Seven 
conversion occurred in February 1983, see Petitioner's Brief at 6, or in November 
1983, see Respondent's Brief at 2. 
78. Id. Shumate filed a Chapter 11 petition on June 1, 1984, which later was 
converted to Chapter 7 on August 24, 1984. 
79. Id. See Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 763 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1985). 
Since all participants in the Coleman Plan except Shumate had a distribution, 
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adversarial position by filing an action to protect and recover Shu-
mate's interest in the plan.80 This action was filed in the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia and was coupled 
with a request made to the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Virginia as part of a related proceeding over 
which the latter court had jurisdiction. 81 In the district court pro-
ceeding, Patterson requested an order compelling Creasy to pay 
the plan benefits over to him; Subsequently, both actions were 
consolidated in district court.82 
Shumate contended that his Plan interest had to be excluded 
from his bankruptcy estate. However, the district court ruled that 
the reference in Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2) to "nonban-
kruptcy law" included only state law and not federallaw. 83 Shu-
mate's interest was reviewed in accordance with Virginia case law 
to determine if it could be termed a spendthrift trust, thereby 
qualifying for protection. The court concluded that it did not, and 
similarly disposed of Shumate's alternative argument that his 
Plan interest was to be treated as exempt property pursuant to 
section 522(b)(2)(A).84 Creasy was finally directed to pay Shu-
mate's plan interest over to Patterson on behalf of the individual 
bankruptcy estate. An appeal from this decision was taken to the 
Fourth Circuit. 85 
the surplus or "plan reversion" was paid over to the Company's bankruptcy 
estate. Petitioner's Brief at 8. 
80. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2245 (1992). The Adversary 
Proceeding for turnover was filed in Bankruptcy Court on April 24, 1987, 
pursuant lIU.S.C. § 542. This "Turnover Action" was instituted to secure 
Shumate's plan benefits for his personal bankruptcy estate. See Petitioner's 
Brief at 8, and Respondent's Brief at 3. 
81. [d. It was agreed by Shumate, Patterson, and Creasy, that Shumate's 
interest in the Plan was valued at $250,000. This agreement subsequently was 
approved by court order dated December 3, 1987. Respondent's Brief at 3. 
82. [d. The district court agreed to hear all matters relating to the disposition 
of Shumate's company plan benefits. Petitioner's Brief at 8. 
83. [d. The memorandum opinion was issued on February 29, 1988. 
84. [d. See generally Petitioner's Brief at 10-13. Since Virginia had opted out 
of the Bankruptcy Code's federal exemption scheme, the district court held that 
ERISA was not intended to be a federal exemption pursuant to § 522(b)(2). 
85 . [d. Patterson filed a motion for disbursement and final order before the 
district court which was granted on September 2, 1988. The order directed the 
payment of Shumate's Plan interest to Patterson to be used for the benefit of 
Shumate's creditors. See Respondent's Brief at 4. The district court's decision in 
the bankruptcy estate was premised on the argument that Shumate's control 
over the pension plan was so pervasive so as not to qualify it as a spendthrift 
trust under Virginia state law. 83 B.R. 404. Additionally, the benefits were not 
13
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Subsequent to the district court's decision, but prior to the 
appeal being heard by a Fourth Circuit panel, the circuit issued its 
decision in the Moore case. As discussed above, Moore held that 
any qualified plan which includes a non-alienation provision, by 
definition, constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law." This 
"plain meaning" interpretation was premised on the notion that 
such plans necessarily include restrictions on the transfer of par-
ticipants' interests, and therefore, inclusion of plan interests ·· In 
the bankruptcy estate is prohibited. Accordingly, the Fourth Cir-
cuit relying upon Moore held that Shumate's plan interest came 
under the purview of section 541(c)(2) and should be properly 
excluded from the bankruptcy estate.86 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to address this important bankruptcy issue and 
to end the controversy that existed amongst the circuit courts of 
appeals. 
The Supreme Court carefully framed the issues in the case 
around the proper definition to be accorded the phrase "applicable 
nonbankruptcy law" for purposes of determining the exclusion 
question under section 541(c)(2).87 From the beginning of its opin-
ion, the Court stressed the importance of looking to the plain lan-
guage of the statute.88 Read in a straightforward fashion, section 
541 does not suggest that there is any limitation on "applicable 
nonbankruptcy law," and certainly no restriction that it be limited 
to only state law.89 The Court noted that the Bankruptcy Code 
exempt under § 522 (b)(2)(A) since the Plan benefits were not "exempt under 
federal law." Id. at 410. See supra note 75 for discussion of Shumate's 
controlling stock interest in the company. 
86. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242; 2245 (1992). The Fourth Circutt 
stated: 
We see no reason to restrict § 541(c)(2),s exclusion provision to 
spendthrift trusts. Instead, following the rule that, whenever possible, 
statutes should be read in harmony and not in conflict, . .. we interpret 
these in such a way as to give full effect to both ERISA and the 
Bankruptcy Code by holding that interests in ERISA-qualified pension 
plans are excluded from a bankrupt's estate. 
Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 365 (4th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). See 
also In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476, 1479-80 (4th Cir. 1990). 
87. 112 S. Ct. at 2246. The Court expressly stated that it had granted 
certiorari "to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals" relative to the 
exclusion question. Id. 
88. Id. Petitioner Patterson took issue with the "plain meaning" argument 
stating that such an approach contradicts the language of the Bankruptcy Code. 
89. Id. The Moore· court framed this question very succinctly: "'Applicable 
nonbankruptcy law' means precisely what it says: all laws, state and federal, 
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makes numerous references to "state law" in various sections, and 
had the drafters intended such a limitation in section 541(c)(2), 
they would have so stated.90 In fact, the absence of such language 
gave the clear impression that Congress intended that debtors be 
allowed to look to both state and federal law in determining what 
constituted "applicable nonbankruptcy law."91 Consequently, the 
Court concluded its analysis of the trustee petitioner's first argu-
ment by stating that ERISA was butane example of federal law to 
which the questioned phrase was referring, and given the clarity 
of the Code section being evaluated, there was no choice but to 
"enforce the statute according to its terms."92 
At this point it was clear that the Court had determined that 
under its plain meaning section 541 could not be restricted or lim-
ited to state law. Without referring to the split in the circuit 
courts of appeals, the Court made it clear that the majority view, 
limiting "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to state spendthrift trust 
law, would no longer be followed. Having disposed of petitioner's 
first argument, the Court next focused on whether the plan in 
question contained an anti-alienation provision comporting with 
ERISA section 541(c)(2).93 This section states that a "pension 
plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not 
be assigned or alienated."94 The applicable Internal Hevenue 
Code section similarly states that a "trust shall not constitute a 
qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which such 
under which a transfer restriction is enforceable. Nothing in the phrase 
'applicable nonbankruptcy law' ... suggests that the phrase refers exclusively to 
state law." In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476,1477-79 (4th Cir. 1990) (cited in Shumate 
v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 364 (4th Cir. 1991». -See also Petitioner's Brief at 25-
26. The Petitioner also urged the Supreme Court to read the Bankruptcy Code 
statute as "a whole and not in isolated parts." Id. at 26 (citing United States v. 
Morton, 467 U.S. 826 (1984». 
90. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. at 2246. The legislative history of 
§ 541(c)(2) is not dispositive of this question as the term "state law" is not 
mentioned. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1 (19'77), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5869. 
91. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2246-47 (1992). The Court cited 
several court decisions where "applicable nonbankruptcy law" has been 
construed to include both state and federal law. This observation was in accord 
"with prevailing interpretations of that phrase as it appears elsewhere in the 
Code." Id. at 2247 n.2. 
92. Id. at 2247 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. , 489 U.S. 235, 
241, (1989». 
93. Patterson, 112 S; Ct. at 2247 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1». 
94.Id. 
1 
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trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may 
not be assigned or alienated."95 Shumate's qualified plan includ.ed 
the provision that a participant's benefit, right or interest shall 
not be "subject to alienation, sale, transfer, assignment, pledge 
encumbrance or charge, seizure, attachment or other legal, equi: 
table or other process."96 The Court took notice of the ERISA see-
tion which requires that plan trustees discharge their duties ion 
conformance with the do.cuments governing the plan, and' cCi)l!l:_ 
cluded that the transfer · restriction in question was mOre tna'lil 
adequate to constitute an enforceable transfer restriction pursu-
ant to Bankruptcy Code section 541(c)(2).97 
The Court then dealt with three additional argUInelitts 
presented by the petitioner challenging the conclusion that quali-
fied pension plan benefits should be excluded from the bankruptcy 
estate. First, petitioner contended that the legislative history of 
section 541(c)(2) was replete with quotes reflecting an unmistaka-
ble intent on the part of Congress to limit the exclusion or plan 
benefits to those qualifying as state spendthrift trusts.98 How-
ever, these references were reviewed by the majority and termed 
"meager" relative to supporting petitioner's claim.99 Petitioner 
next argued that any decision to exclude plan benefits from the 
estate in a wholesale fashion would render the exemption provi-
sion contained in section 522(d)(10) meaningless. lOo This provi-
sion states that a debtor electing to use the federal exemption list 
in section 522 may exempt f(.,Om the estate any right to receive "a 
payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or 
similar plan or contract."lOl As mentioned previously, this exem:p-
tion option is limited to those amounts necessary to provide rea-
sonably necessary support to the debtor and the debtor's 
dependents. 102 
The Court refused to accept this argument on the theory that 
the exemption provision was written much more broadly than the 
anti-alienation exclusion in section 541(c)(2).103 The exemption 
95. [d. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13)). 
96. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (1992) (citing Article 16.1.of 
Coleman's plan). 
97. [d. at 2247-48. 
98. [d. at 2248. 
99. [d. 
100. [d. at 2248-49. 
101. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2249 (1992). 
102. [d. 
103. [d. 
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provision permits the debtor to exempt rights in both qualified 
and nonqualified plan benefits, whereas the anti-transfer exclu-
sion is limited to those ERISA qualified plans containing the 
required restrictive clauses. l04 Finally, the Court dismissed the 
argument that its interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code would 
frustrate a broader policy of insuring that the bankruptcy estate 
casts a wide net in capturing the debtor's assets. 105 Justice Black-
"mun rejected petitioner's interpretation given the plain meaning 
of the sections in dispute. l06 To the contrary, the Court's opinion 
was consistent with previous cases in which it had "declined to 
recognize any exceptions to ERISA's anti-alienation provision 
outside the bankruptcy context."107 Further, the Court's adoption 
of the plain meaning view would provide appropriate support to 
ERISA's broad goal of protecting pension plan benefits, as well as 
the overriding policy of insuring an "uniform national treatment 
of pension benefits."108 
V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AFTER PATTERSON 
A. Nonqualified Pension Plans 
The Patterson decision gives every appearance of finally put-
ting to rest the question of how qualified pension plan benefits are 
to be handled in bankruptcy proceedings. There is general 
acknowledgement that the decision will govern a large percentage 
of corporate retirement plans. However, the pension plan at issue 
in Patterson included over four hundred employees and was not 
specifically designed to serve as a "top heavy" ,plan benefitting 
only one or just a few highly compensated individuals. The Patter-
son plan was in all respects a traditional "qualified" plan as con-
templated by ERISA, and the analysis provided by the Supreme 
Court centered around the language in the ERISA statute which 
affords special protections to those pension plans meeting the req-
uisite statutory requirements. l09 . 
Unfortunately, many workers are heavily involved in pension 
plans that fall outside the umbrella of ERISA. These plans 
include Keogh plans or Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA), 
104. [d. 
105. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2249 (1992). 
106. [d. 
107. [d. at 2050. 
108. [d. 
109. [d. at 2245. 
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which are quite popular with self-employed individuals and are 
"self settled" in that the grantor of the trust is also the beneficiary. 
In either case, the pensioner faces the prospect that these non-
qualified pension plan benefits will not be covered by Patterson 
because these trusts do not include an anti-alienation provision as 
required by ERISA. As a result, a serious unanswered. questiolili 
following Patterson concerns the treatment of nonqualified pen-
sion plan benefits as property of the bankruptcy estate. 110 
If Patterson does not exclude nonqualified plan benefits from 
the bankruptcy estate, then the debtor must seek protection of 
these assets under exemption rules. As discussed above, sectiolil 
522 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a list of exempt property: 
that is reserved for debtors who do not reside in "opt out" states. 
Under section 522(d)(10)(E)111 the debtor generally can exempt 
payments from a pension plan, ERISA qualified or not, "to the 
extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any 
dependent of the debtor."112 This obviously provides only partial 
protection since the support requirement is subject to interpreta-
tion, and in any event, would not provide Patterson-like one hun-
dred percent protection unless substantial support needs were 
demonstrated by the debtor. 
Absent support needs, though, the federal exemption would 
be meaningless. It should also be pointed out that the protection 
afforded by Patterson is irrespective of the debtor's need for sup-
port payments. Practically speaking, the federal exemption 
requires that the debtor tap the pension plan for living expenses, 
rather than preserve it for the intended purpose of providing sup-
port at retirement. As a policy matter, this result is at sev:ere 
110. ]In Patterson, the Supreme Court noted that a variety of nonqualified 
pension plans do not include an anti-alienation clause as required by ERISA and, 
therefore, would not be afforded coverage under the decision: 
[P]ension plans established by governmental entities and churches need 
not comply with Subchapter I of ERISA, including the anti-alienation 
requirement of § 206(d)(1) .... So too, pension plans that qualify for 
preferential tax treatment under 26 U.S.C. § 408 (individual retirement 
accounts) are specifically excepted from ERISA's anti-alienation 
requirement. . . . Although a debtor's interest in these plans could 
not be excluded under § 541(c)(2) because the plans lack transfer 
restrictions enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcy law," that 
interest nevertheless could be exempted under § 522(d)(10)(E). 
Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250. 
111. 11 U.S. C.' § 522(d)(10)(E) (1988). 
112. Id. 
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cross-purposes with the Patterson decision, wherein the Court 
noted that one goal of ERISA was to insure that "if a worker has 
been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement - and if 
he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a 
vested benefit - he actually will receive it."113 
If the debtor resides in an "opt out" state, the handling of non-
qualified pension plan benefits depends on the wording of state 
exemption law. States that base their exemption protection of 
pension plans on spendthrift trust law would pose a serious prob-
lem to the IRA or Keogh participant. These latter plans are typi-
cally "self settled" and do not include the restrictions on the 
beneficiary's ability to utilize or assign the proceeds that are 
required in a spendthrift trust arrangement. This would leave 
IRAs and Keogh accounts outside the protection of state exemp-
tion law, and thereby force their inclusion in the bankruptcy 
estate. 
Another consideration regardless of whether the state exemp-
tion law focuses on spendthrift trusts, is the possibility that any 
state law exempting retirement plans from the bankruptcy estate 
would be subject to preemption by ERISA.114 Even though the 
ERISA preemption provision has been held not to apply to IRAs by 
most bankruptcy courts,115 the debtor with nonqualified pension 
plan assets bears the burden of ascertaining the consequences in 
the state where the petition will be filed. This result is also at 
cross-purposes with Patterson, since one of the reasons the 
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case was due to the wide dis-
parity in the various Circuits that clearly had placed a premium 
on pre-bankruptcy forum shopping by debtors with significant 
sums in ERISA qualified plans. If such forum shopping by quali-
fied plan participants was a problem prior to Patterson, then it 
continues to be a problem with similarly situated nonqualified 
plan participants . 
113. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (1992) (citing Nachman Corp. 
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 375 (1980». 
114. 29 U.s.C. § 1144(a) (1988). Section 514(a) of ERISA states that the 
statute shall "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." Id. 
115. In re Laxson, 102 B.R. 85 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989); In re Ridgway, 108 
B.R. 294 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1989); In re Martin, 102 B.R. 653 (Bankr. W.D. 
Tenn. 1989); In re Ewell, 104 B.R. 458 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989). 
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B. Fraudulent Transfers 
Section 548(a)116 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a 
trustee has the power to avoid a fraudulent transfer by the debtor 
of his interest in property, if such transfer was made within '~ne 
year prior to filing the petitionY7 Under section 541(a)(l), the 
trustee must prove either that the debtor exhibited actual ~ntent 
to defraud, or that there were significant indications or "badg~s of 
fraud" present to infer actual intent, and therefore, to estabhsn 
constructive fraud. 118 In the latter case, courts generally . have 
considered a variety of factors to establish constructive fqlUd, 
such as: 1) the failure of debtor to receive adequate consideration, 
2) the allegeq. fraudulent transfer occurring after the debtor's 
financial difficulties have begun, and 3) the debtor continuing 
using or enjoying the benefits of the transferred propertyY9 If 
actual intent can be proven, either directly or by inference, the 
transfer is voidable without a showing that the debtor was insol-
vent at the time of the transfer.120 Finally, a transfer is also 
deemed to be fraudulent pursuant to section 548(a)(2)(A) if tne 
debtor received less than a reasonably equivalent value and was 
insolvent on the date the transfer was made or became insolvent 
as a result of the conveyance. 121 
116. Section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in 
property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or 
incurred on or within one yea; ' before the date of the filing of the 
petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily -
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual 
intent to hinder, delay or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or 
became, on or after the date that su'ch transfer was made or such ' \ 
obligation incurred, indebted; or 
(2)(A) received less that a reasonably equivalent value in exchange 
for such transfer or obligation; and 
(B)(i) was insolvent . .. ; 
(ii) . .. [had] unreasonably small capital; or 
(iii) . .. would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay . .. 
11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988). 
117. Id. 
118. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1991). 
119. See In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir. 1983). 
120. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1988). 
121. Although there are a number of tests used to determine whether'the 
debtor received "less than reasonably equivalent value" for the alleged 
fraudulent transfer, a detailed discussion is not necessary when considering pre-
bankruptcy payments by a debtor to pension plan. This is due to the fact that the 
debtor receives nothing from the trust fund in return, and therefore, would 
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Given the context of the Patterson decision, what exposure 
does a debtor anticipating bankruptcy have under Code section 
548 when he purposefully makes significant contributions to a 
qualified pension plan in order to avoid having the cash assets be 
made part of the bankruptcy estate? The intended purpose would 
be clearly to defeat creditor claims to the assets. Such transfers 
could be attacked easily, and even if actual intent could not be 
established, a good case for constructive fraudulent intent could 
be made based on the factors noted above. This issue was not 
addressed specifically by the Court, although nothing in the Pat-
terson decision should be construed as overcoming this fraudulent 
transfer provision. The problem with this potential argument is 
, that it is policy based, and if one thing is made clear by Justice 
Blackmun's opinion, it is that the overriding consideration in Pat-
terson was to give "full and appropriate effect to ERISA's goal of 
protecting pension benefits."122 Blackmun went on to say that 
"our holding furthers another important policy underlying ERISA: 
uniform national treatment of pension benefits."123 
, In effect, in a battle of policy arguments, debtors can make 
the case that the policy embodied in section 548 must give way to 
that broader policy enunciated in Patterson regarding consistent 
treatment of pension plans. Trustees and creditors clearly will 
argue that a transfer deemed fraudulent under section 548 must 
be construed as an exception to the Patterson case. However , in 
the meantime, given the unce:r:.tainty that this policy exception 
will be recognized, debtors would be well advised to engage in 
some creative pre-bankruptcy planning by making cash transfers 
to qualified plans and thereby force the courts to address the 
issue. 
C. Voidable Preferences 
A similar issue is presented by the Code's voidable preference 
provision. Under section 547(b),124 a transfer made within ninety 
always be construed to have received less than reasonably equivalent value for 
the cash transfers. 
122. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (1992). 
123. [d. The Court stated further that its decision would ensure "that the 
treatment of pension benefits will not vary based on the beneficiary's bankruptcy 
status." [d. at 2249. 
124. Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may 
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property -
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
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days of filing the bankruptcy petition is voidable by the trustee if 
it is made while the debtor is insolvent, it is made to or for the 
benefit of a creditor in consideration for an antecedent debt, and it 
results in the creditor receiving more than he would have h~en 
entitled to had the transfer not occurred and had the estate beE\n 
completely liquidated in accordance with Chapter Seven. 125 Most 
importantly, the ninety day period can be extended to one year if 
the creditor is an insider.126 
Once again assume a hypothetical debtor contemplating 
bankruptcy has fallen behind in making payments to his or its 
qualified pension plan pursuant to the plan agreement. The tr~st 
becomes a creditor of the debtor and now has a claim that can he 
considered to he a preexisting or antecedent debt. Having heeD 
advised of the legal consequences of the Patterson decision, the 
debtor makes a significant contribution to the qualified pensio:1!l 
plan within ninety days preceding bankruptcy. Will the policy, 
underlying the voidable preference provision prevail given the pol-
icy objectives of the Patterson case? The bankruptcy trustee 
would argue that had the payments not been made, the pension 
plan would not have received as much, and would have been rele-
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before 
such transfer was made; 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made--
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; 
or 
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date ofthe filing of 
the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an 
insider; and 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would 
receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title [11 U.S.C. 
§§ 701-706]; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent 
provided by the provisions of this title [11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330]. 
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). An antecedent debt has been construed to be a 
preexisting debt of a "liability on a claim." In the context of considering transfers 
to a pension plan, the pre-bankruptcy payments to the fund would have to be due 
and owing prior to the date the pet.ition was filed. A mere voluntary payment' to 
a pension plan arguably would not come under t.he purview of this provision. ' Jd. 
at § 101(11). Kallen v. Litas, 47 B.R. 977 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985). 
125. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1988). 
126. 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (1988). 
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gated to a payment under a fourth priority as detailed in Banlc-
ruptcy Code section 507(a)(4).127 
The debtor would certainly argue in this situation that the 
payments fall within the "transfer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness" exception to the voidable preference rule. 128 The critical 
issue would be whether the debt had been incurred in the ordinary 
course of business as that term is contemplated in the Code. 
Although the Code generally envisions this exception being 
applied to a more traditional creditor with whom the debtor has 
conducted business, courts have considered factors such as 
whether the debt accrued in prior course of dealing and was in 
accordance with ordinary business terms.129 Certainly, these 
arguments can be made by the qualified plan trustee who would 
ascend to the status of creditor once the required funding pay-
ments were not made. More importantly, the trustee could argue 
that the court should never even reach the exceptions to section 
547(b), since the pension protection policy of Patterson is clear, 
unambiguous, and controlling. 
A more interesting voidable preference issue is presented if 
the above referenced debtor is a corporation, which after falling 
behind in payments to the qualified plan, relies on an insider who 
personally guarantees a promissory note payable to the plan. In 
this case the argument is stronger that the insider is also a credi-
tor of the debtor since any pre-bankruptcy payments made to the 
plan would reduce the insider's p~rsonalliability on the guaran-
tee. This exact scenario was presented in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand 
Fin. Corp., 130 and Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit held 
that payments to pension plans made more than ninety days prior 
to filing the petition could be recovered by the bankruptcy trustee 
if the plan trust negotiated for and received a personal guarantee 
from an insider. 131 In that case, the funds paid to the plan "should 
be treated just like any other outside creditor"132 pursuant to the 
voidable preference rules. This case has been followed by other 
127. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (1988). See generally In re Columbia Packing Co., 47 
B.R. 126 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985). 
128. 11 U.s.C. § 547(c)(2) (1988); In re Fulghum Constr. Corp., 872 F.2d '739 
(6th Cir. 1989). 
129. In re White, 58 B.R. 266 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986). 
130. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). 
131. Id. at. 1200 .. 01. 
132. Id. at 1200. 
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circuits133 but openly criticized by bankruptcy courts134 and Con-
gress. 135 In fact, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
Act136 contains language in section 204 which would specifically 
overrule the result reached in Levit .137 However, the practical . 
matter is that the Bankruptcy Reform Amendments of 1992 have 
not been enacted, leaving this Seventh Circuit decision intact. 
The issue presented here is how will the Levit case affect the abil-
ity of a bankruptcy trustee to recover these guaranteed payine:dts ' , 
under the voidable preference provision in light of the seeming 
broad protection afforded qualified plans by the Patterson 
decision? 
133. In re Erin Food Serv., Inc., 980 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1992); In re C-L Cartage 
Co., 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990); In re H & S Transp. Co., 939 F.2d 355 (6th 
Cir. 1991); Plumbers Pension Fund V. Niedrich, 891 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930 (1990); In re Suffola, Inc., 2 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1993); In 
re Robinson Bros. Drilling, 97 B.R. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988), affd, 892 F.2d 
850 (10th Cir. 1989); Southmark Corp. V. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc., 9!;l3 , 
F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1993). . . 
134. In re Erin Food Services, Inc., 980 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1992); In re C-L 
Cartage Co., 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990); In re H & S Transp. Co., 939 F.2d 355 
(6th Cir. 1991); Plumbers' Pension Fund v. Niedrich, 891 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 
1989); In re Suffola, 2 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, 97 
B.R. 77 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988), affd, 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989); 
Southmark Corp. V. Southmark Personal Storage, Inc., 993 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 
1993). 
135. In re Rubin Bros. FootweaF, liie., 119 B.R. 416 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In 
re J.T.L. Supermarket Corp., 145 B.R. 4 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Arundel 
Hous. Components, 126 B.R. 216 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991); In re Performarice 
Communications, Inc., 126 B.R. 473 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 1991). 
136. National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, S. 1985, 102d Cong;, 2d · 
Sess. (1992), reported in 138 Cong. Rec. § 8241 (June 16, 1992). Senator Heflin 
commented on section 204 of the Act: 
Id. 
This section seeks to overturn the Deprizio line of opinions begun in 
Levit V. Ingersoll - in re V.N. Deprezio Construction Co. - 874 F.2d 1186, 
7th Cir 1989. This case turned upon issues involving guarantees and 
who may be considered an insider for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. 
The specific language of this section has received a great deal of 
attention in order to narrowly but clearly overrule this series of 
opinions. We believe that we have accomplished this task. The specific 
language contained in the substitute bill which is before the Senate is 
different from that which was reported by the committee. We believe 
that we have improved upon the language which is reflected in this bill, 
and that it accomplishes its task of returning the understanding of the 
status of the law to that which predated the Deprizio opinion. 
137. Id. at § 8242. 
1994] 
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According to Levit, an insider who personally guaranteed pay-
ment to a pension trust fund would be treated as any other credi-
tor for purposes of the voidable preference rule, noting that the 
ninety day period would be extended to a full year. This decision 
clearly conflicts with Patterson and makes no distinction between 
cases where the insider-creditor may have acted in good faith in 
signing the personal guarantees. The practical effect of Levit is 
that the pension trust fund would be in a prefer:r:ed p.osition if the 
insider did not sign the personal guarantee, thereby iInplementing 
the ninety day voidable preference period under section 547(b). In 
any event, given the facts as presented in Levit, a bankruptcy 
trustee could rely on this precedent to recover the pre-filing pay-
ments made to the pension fund despite the holding in Patterson. 
C. Nondischargeable Debts and Rollovers 
Assuming that a debtor has not made transfers that may be 
subject to attack under the fraudulent or voidable transfer provi-
sions of the Code, simply relying on Patterson to protect a quali-
fied pension plan through the bankruptcy proceeding may not 
deter some creditors from ultimately gaining access to the trust 
fund. The Patterson case speaks only to the protection of qualified 
pension plan funds during the bankruptcy process. However, 
when a bankruptcy proceeding is terminated, many debtors are 
still burdened with a variety of debts that are nondischargeable 
pursuant to Code § 523.138 This p;ovision applies to all debtors 
granted a discharge under Chapters Seven, Eleven, or Twelve, as 
well as hardship discharges under Chapter Thirteen.139 In any 
event, the effect of the discharge is to allow creditors with debts 
that were not discharged to pursue the debtor for collection. The 
only requirement is that the creditor wait until the debtor is actu-
ally discharged so as not to violate the automatic stay imposed 
upon the filing of the petition, which prohibits all legal actions 
outside the context of the bankruptcy proceeding. 140 
A debtor who has successfully negotiated the bankruptcy pro-
cess and thereby protected her qualified pension plan must be 
aware that plan proceeds are not immune from potential post-
bankruptcy collection efforts by nondischarged creditors, or by 
creditors with debts accruing post-petition. This problem is of 
138. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1988). 
139. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988). 
140. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988). 
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particular importance to debtors who, pursuant to the terms of 
their pension plan, are eligible to make withdrawals from the 
fund, have a right to assign any or all of the fund's assets, or have 
reached an age where withdrawals from the trust fund are 
mandatory. When this is the case, the anti-alienation clause does 
not afford the debtor the same protection as discussed earlier,141 
and the nondischarged creditor can assert a right to any share of 
the plan's assets which the debtor could presently claim. ' T0 
underscore the importance of this unsettled issue, the Patterson 
decision anticipated such questions by including a footnote which 
explicitly stated that this matter was being reserved. The Court 
stated, "We express no opinion on the separate question whether 
section 522(d)(10)(E) applies only to distributions from a pension 
plan that a debtor has an immediate and present right to receive, 
or to the entire undistributed corpus of a pension trust."142 
The essence of this post-bankruptcy argument is that if the 
debtor has a right to the plan's funds, regardless of whether she 
chooses to exercise that right, the nondischarged creditor is legally 
entitled to effect a collection action against that share of the plan's 
assets. 143 Alternatively, the creditor may also initiate an action in 
equity to for~e the debtor to make the withdrawal or assignment. 
This may be preferable from the perspective of the plan's tnlstee 
since it would be the actual plan participant making the request, 
rather than the trustee repsonding to a court order mandating 
direct payment to the nondischarged creditor. In this latter case, 
the trustee would quite correctly be concerned about violating the 
ERISA anti-alienation restriction and thereby jeopardizing the 
trust fund's qualified status.144 . 
Pension plan participants must also be cognizant of the 
unprotected status of IRAs and Keogh accounts, especially in the 
141. The anti-alienation clause contained in Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(2) 
excludes pension plans that have such a transfer made by a trustee in violation 
of this clause would risk disqualification of the plan. See supra note 56 for IRS 
private letter rulings supporting this statement. Consequently, if a plan 
participant's right to make a withdrawal from the fund had matured, or existed 
pursuant to any valid claim under law, the trustee would not be risking the 
qualified status of the fund by making the transfer. This would mean that the 
anti-alienation clause could not successfully be used as a shield by the 
participant and the fund trustee to thwart a creditor's efforts to force a transfer 
to the participant. 
142. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2249 n.5 (1992). 
143. In re Reid, 139 B.R. 19 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1992). 
144. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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context of making a rollover contribution. Rollovers are often con-
sidered by plan participants in a variety of circumstances. A par-
ticipant having accepted employment with another company, may 
want to terminate her retirement account with her previous 
employer. Also, as was the case in Patterson, the employer may 
terminate operations, either in or outside of bankruptcy, and liq-
uidate its pension plan by making distributions to all partici-
pants. 145 Finally, the participant may seek to consolidate a 
number of pension plans for convenience in fund management, or 
to simplify annual withdrawals upon reaching retirement age. In 
each of these scenarios, a rollover into a nonqualified plan would 
strip the debtor of coverage under Patterson . 
In light of the fact that Patterson protection will not be avail-
able, it would be preferable for debtors to leave funds in a quali-
fied plan. The debtor should also consider t ransferring 
nonqualified plan assets into a corporate qualified plan whenever 
that option is available. However, it is important to remember 
that post-Patterson nonqualified plans will be governed by exemp-
tion law. Therefore, if the debtor's state of residence provides for a 
one-hundred percent exemption of IRAs, which would include rol-
lovers from qualified plans, the debtor could consider this option, 
keeping in mind potential violations of the fraudulent or voidable 
transfer rules discussed above. 
Rollovers in violation of fraudulent or voidable transfer rules 
could be reversed despite favorable "'state exemption law. How-
ever, the fraudulent transfer rules are generally applicable to 
transactions where the debtor seeks to convert non-exempt prop-
er ty into exempt property. In a rollover from a qualified plan to a 
nonqualified plan, the assets are also exempt property as part of 
the qualified plan and would arguably remain exempt property 
once deposited in the IRA. A debtor could argue that the charac-
ter of the property never changed during the rollover process, and 
therefore, the fraudulent transfer rules do not apply.146 
Rollovers present a policy problem similar to that discussed 
with respect to fraudulent and voidable transfers. The treatment 
of rollovers into a nonqualified plan depends upon the peculiari-
ties of state exemption law. Debtors who live in states with less 
than favorable exemption law may be able to achieve the same 
advantage by establishing an IRA in a state that has the desired 
145. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
146. See generally In re Swift, 124 B.R. 475 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991). 
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exemption law, and preferably, where this question has already 
been tested in the courts. Given these circumstances, in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding the debtor could argue that in accordance with 
conflict of laws principles, the bankruptcy court is obligated to fol-
low the exemption law of the state in which the IRA is situated 
rather than the law of the state in which the petition was filed. ' 
Once again, it is obvious that the Patterson ruling has left 
open potential forum shopping and creative pre-bankruptcy plaFl-
ning options that are just as significant as those that existed prior 
to the Court's handling of this matter. However, planning oppor-
tunities that exist now with respect to rollovers are fraught with 
potential pitfalls and dire consequences to the pre-bankruptcy 
debtor if undertaken casually. Since state law varies widely on 
the exemption and rollover issues, it is vital that debtors rely on 
expert advice prior to effecting any such transactions, regardless 
of whether bankruptcy is contemplated. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Prior to the Patterson decision there can be no question that 
the various · case lines concerning the includability of qualified 
pension plan benefits in the bankruptcy estate were contradictory 
and irreconcilable. The Patterson case clarified this question in a 
su~mary fashion, forestalling any serious conflicts with the IRS 
that might have led to catastrophic consequences had any plans 
been disqualified as the private letter rulings indicated.147 Given 
this potential result the question remains why it took so long for 
the Supreme Court to address this matter. From 1982 to 1985 the 
primary cases delineating the state spendthrift trust view had 
been decided by the four circuits following this approach,148 while 
after the Fourth Circuit's Moore decision six years passed before 
the issues were addressed by enough of the other circuits such 
that the "plain meaning" view achieved parity. 
Perhaps the Supreme Court was hesitant to overrule a view 
that achieved a seeming overwhelming majority status in such a 
short period of time, and maybe it took the decisions of 1991 to 
convince the Court that the time had come to settle the matter. 
This is, of course, mere speculation, but the fact that the Patterson 
opinion is virtually devoid of any substantive discussion of the tel-
ativemerits of the competing views, indicates that there was vir-
147. See supra note 56 for a listing of these Private Letter Rulings. 
148. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text. 
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tually no disagreement as to what the outcome of the case would 
be. Only Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Patterson, 
raised the question as to how so many appellate courts could have 
reached any other conclusion regarding the interpretation of the 
phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy law" than that reached by the 
Goff court in 1983.149 
In the end, though, it can be said that Patterson offers signifi-
cant assistance relative to the handling of qualified pension plan 
benefits in bankruptcy, despite the serious questions that remain 
unanswered. 150 The decision is an important step toward achiev-
ing the equitable and consistent treatment of debtors with qualify-
ing plan assets that is a trademark policy of the Bankruptcy Code. 
The importance of Patterson will become more evident when the 
decision is harmonized with the other provisions contained in the 
Code. Congress is already dealing with some of the issues 
presented in this article, most notably the questions raised about 
the treatment of nonqualified pension plans and their potential 
interplay with the Patterson decision, as well as the insider-credi-
tor issue presented in Levit. Under current legislation aimed at 
reforming the Bankruptcy Code and which codifies the Patterson 
result, the scope of protection afforded pension plans is expanded 
to include many non qualified plans. 151 However, this is little con-
solation to debtors currently contemplating bankruptcy. They 
must work with the Patterson decision and its attendant unan-
swered questions. 
149. Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2250-51 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
150. Shortly after the Patterson decision was handed down, the Supreme Court 
considered the question of whether a governmental pension plan should be 
included in the bankruptcy estate. See In re Leadbetter, 946 F.2d895 (6th Cir. 
1991) (unpublished). The Sixth Circuit held that a state employee's interest in a 
governmental pension plan covered by 26 U.S.C. § 457 (1988) had to be included 
in the bankruptcy estate. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case 
for consideration in light of Patterson. See Ohio Pub. Employees Deferred 
Compensation Program v. Sicherman, 112 S. Ct. 2987 (1992). The Court had 
noted in the Patterson opinion that this type of pension plan was not covered 
relative to the manner in which the issues had been presented in that case. 
Patterson, 112 S. Ct. at 2249. 
151. S. 1985, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(c) (1991). See also H.R. 3804, 102d 
Congo 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1991). 
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